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Variations among the diverse pension systems in the member states of the European Union (EU) ham-
per labor market mobility across national borders and also among firms within the countries of the 
EU. From a macroeconomic perspective, and in the light of demographic pressure, this paper argues 
that allowing individual pension accounts instead of collective pension plans would greatly improve 
labor market flexibility and would thus enhance the functioning of the monetary union. I argue that 
working citizens would benefit by having their pension funds accumulating in individual pension sav-
ings accounts for three reasons. First, citizens would have a clear picture of the accumulation of their 
own pension savings throughout their working lives. Second, they would pay minimal extra costs, 
and third, they would not be subject to the whims of governments or other pension fund managers 
after they retired. This paper investigates the feasibility of individual pension accumulation plans un-
der various parameter settings by calculating the value of the pension saved during a working life and 
the amount of the pension dis-saved after retirement. The findings show that there are no reasons 
why the EU and the individual member states should not allow individual pension savings accounts. 
This approach, as an alternative to forcing workers to participate in one of the various mandatory 
collective pension schemes that exist in different countries in the EU, would have macroeconomic 
benefits and would also provide a solid pension program that can enhance mobility.  
Introduction
One in ten European citizens has lived in more than 
one EU country, usually for work reasons. Job mobility 
is an indicator of the flexibility of the labor market, and 
it is vital for the effective functioning of the European 
Economic and Monetary Union. Nevertheless, indi-
vidual workers are hampered from moving to more 
productive jobs or locations by the patchwork of social 
security systems across the Union (EU, 2012). Work-
ers who frequently change jobs participate in various 
pension  schemes  that  are  administered  by  different 
governments  and  pension  funds,  and  they  tend  to 
lose sight of their rights and entitlements. This lack of 
transparency relating to pension accounts is particu-
larly unfortunate for working EU citizens who change 
jobs because pension payments can amount to 30% of 
a person’s gross salary.
Each of the 27 member states of the EU has its own 
pension system consisting of at least one, but often two 
or even three components (see also Holzmann & Pala-
cios, 2001). All countries have a state pension system 
as the first component, but the pension payments and 
pension outcomes of the state pension systems differ 
across  countries.  For  the  second  component,  some 
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countries have a pay-as-you-go system, whereas others 
have a funded system, but both of these systems exist 
in many different forms. The third component consists 
of private savings. The lack of coherence between all 
of these different systems does not encourage labor 
mobility within countries, and it definitely hampers 
mobility across the EU borders. 
Pension contributions are usually mandatory and 
collective. In most EU-countries, citizens have no di-
rect say in how these funds are invested and can only 
hope that the outcome will be sufficient for their retire-
ment. The global financial crisis of 2008-09 did not im-
prove matters. It has had a negative impact on the EU-
citizens’ confidence in the institutional investors and 
in the Ministries of Finance that serve as the guardians 
of  their  pension  funds.  In  countries  where  pension 
systems depend on investment returns, the situation 
has worsened as monetary policy has loosened, stock 
markets have become volatile and depressed, and the 
safe haven of the government bond has come under 
pressure. Moreover, the poor state of public finances 
in many EU countries has injected uncertainty into the 
level of pension payments that workers can expect to 
receive from governments in the future. Due to high 
public debt and high public deficits, state pension pay-
ments are under more pressure than ever before. For 
this reason, citizens need to have a clear picture of their 
pension funds during their (long) working and retire-
ment lives. Individual pension schemes could provide 
full clarity, but only under the precondition that the 
pension savings that have accumulated during a per-
son’s working life are sufficient to cover the total pen-
sion payments throughout the estimated length of the 
person’s retirement life. 
This paper focuses on individual pension schemes 
and  examines  the  advantages  that  they  could  offer 
working EU citizens who wish to cross national bor-
ders during their careers. The life plans of an average 
worker in the EU will be explored in terms of differ-
ent parameter settings that take the following factors 
into account: the rate of salary growth, the amount of 
pension savings, the length of a person’s working life, 
the number of years in retirement, the level of pension 
payments and the rates of return on savings. Analyses 
will show whether an individual pension scheme would 
be  feasible and whether the average worker would 
have enough money to meet his or her ends if such 
an approach were adopted. The advantages of indi-
vidual pension schemes are discussed from an average 
worker’s point of view and also from a macroeconomic 
perspective. The advantages are also examined in the 
light of counterarguments. The relevant literature on 
this topic will be noted, even though little is currently 
known about individual pension schemes because they 
have not been widely adopted, except in Chile.
The outline of this paper is as follows. Section 2 
contains an in-depth discussion of labor mobility in 
the EU from a macroeconomic perspective. Section 
3 examines an individual EU-worker’s income during 
his lifespan. Section 4 generalizes from the individual 
example given in section 3 and analyzes the outcomes 
for pension savings under different parameter in or-
der to evaluate the ability of an individual worker to 
afford the payments into a viable individual pensione 
scheme. Section 5 summarizes the primary benefits 
of an individual pension scheme for an individual EU 
worker. Section 6 presents counterarguments by asking 
whether there is any reason why we should not favor 
an individual pension scheme. Section 7 summarizes 
the foregoing material, draws conclusions, and offers 
policy recommendations.
The importance of labor mobility and 
the role of pensions 
The  European  Economic  and  Monetary  Union, 
which includes seventeen economies that have a com-
mon currency and a common monetary policy, is in 
need of further economic integration. The effects of 
asymmetric  shocks  can  only  be  mitigated  by  some 
form of adjustment mechanisms in either public fi-
nance or in the labor markets. The asymmetric shocks 
that hit several member states in the aftermath of the 
global  economic  crisis  (2008-09)  caused  sovereign 
debt crises in Greece, Ireland and Portugal. The com-
mon EU monetary policy cannot be adapted to spe-
cifically target these problem countries. Exchange rates 
are fixed, and interest rates are basically common, so 
adjustments in exchange rates and interest rates are 
not feasible policy instruments for countries that have 
been hit by asymmetric shocks. As a consequence, in 
the absence of a common fiscal policy, an effectively 
functioning labor market is crucial (see also Jousten 
& Pestieau, 2002; Peeters & Den Reijer, 2012; Razin & 
Sadka, 1999). 24 Marga Peeters
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Quickly matching labor supply and labor demand 
would  not  increase  unemployment  levels.  Further-
more, flexible wages could function as a price mecha-
nism to match supply and demand. Excess labor sup-
ply in certain countries or regions in the EU could 
cancel out excess labor demand in other areas of the 
EU. Flexible labor markets can cushion the effects of 
asymmetric shocks and can absorb or even prevent 
future shocks. Moreover, a flexible labor market can 
keep wage growth moderate and can thereby improve 
international  competitiveness  and  help  to  maintain 
price stability. However, a precondition for the effec-
tive functioning of a flexible labor market is that peo-
ple must be in a position (both financially and socially) 
to move from one region to another and to thus supply 
their labor in locations where there is excess demand.
The existing literature shows that labor market mo-
bility in the EU has generally been low (see for instance 
Cavelaars & Hessel, 2007; Huber, 2004), even though 
every EU citizen has the right to live and work in every 
other country in the EU. As a positive sign, labor mo-
bility within the EU is currently increasing (see Table 
1 in Peeters, 2011; European Commission, 2011). In 
light of demographic developments in the EU, there is 
expected to be more pressure to increase labor mobility 
in future decades. According to the population projec-
tions of the United Nations, the populations in all EU 
countries are ageing. This means that there is likely to 
be a decline in the production of goods and the supply 
of services, and that there will be less support for fiscal 
spending on older citizens. A decreasing cohort group 
of working-age citizens will have to provide health care 
and other services for an increasing cohort group of 
elderly citizens. Only a flexible labor market will be 
able to ensure that enough qualified workers are avail-
able to fill existing job vacancies. Unless working-age 
people who do not currently work full-time become 
fully available in the labor markets, demographic pres-
sure will encourage more cross-border movement of 
workers.  Temporary  contracts  that  offer  additional 
payments to people so they can be hired rapidly will 
also contribute positively to the efficient functioning of 
the labor market because they can make it possible for 
supply to meet demand on a timely basis.  Peeters and 
Groot (2012) show that among the European countries, 
the Czech Republic, Poland and Greece will suffer the 
most from aging populations in terms of pressure on 
the labor markets and future fiscal expenditures on 
old-age pensions.
Pensions, particularly non-state pensions, are a ma-
jor impediment to labor mobility (see Cavelaars & Hes-
sel, 2007; European Commission, 2010a, b). In most 
EU countries, domestic pension portability is not easy. 
Changing jobs often means that the accumulated pen-
sion funds remain with the previous pension fund and 
are not transferred to the fund connected with the new 
position (see Arza & Kohli, 2008; Börsch-Supan, 2006; 
OECD, 2011; Zaidi et al., 2006).  Pension portability 
between EU countries is even more difficult and costly, 
and it is sometimes impossible. Regulatory systems dif-
fer widely, and changing jobs is a time-consuming pro-
cess that entails high administrative costs. An individual 
worker who changes jobs is faced with a fragmented 
accumulation of pension funds that is located with the 
current employer(s) as well as with various previous 
employers (see European Commission, 2010a).
Fragmented pension savings and a lack of trans-
parency  about  the  outcome  of  future  pension  ben-
efits make people wary. In their search for job market 
opportunities, people will tend to look within their 
own  countries  rather  than  going  across  the  border 
to a neighboring EU country unless the wages in the 
other country are significantly higher (as they are, for 
example, in countries in the west of the EU compared 
to countries in the east). A worker who is mobile and 
who changes jobs within the EU is not only faced with 
huge differences in the public pension schemes, but 
also with a wide variety of private schemes across EU-
countries. Private schemes are even more varied be-
cause some countries have both mandatory and non-
mandatory schemes, and in all of these schemes, there 
are differences in the size of contributions and in the 
associated benefit outcomes. The accumulated pension 
entitlements when a person retires are thus a patch-
work of different schemes (see Adema & Ladaique, 
2009). Even in cases where an overview of the pension 
benefits is available, it is not easy to understand.
From a macroeconomic viewpoint, labor mobility 
should be stimulated instead of being hampered, and 
mobile workers should be rewarded rather than being 
punished. Because the average working lifetime is long 
(often more than 40 years), people usually only start to 
think about the effective result of their pension funds 
at a late stage. At that point in life, it is often more dif-Vizja Press&IT www.ce.vizja.pl
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ficult to accelerate pension savings. If the accumulated 
savings are not sufficient to cover, let us say, 30 years 
of living expenses after a worker has retired from the 
labor market, the worker could seek opportunities to 
replenish the funds. Finding another job with a better 
salary or working more hours is generally easier for 
younger workers who are more flexible. 
In the existing literature that addresses the obstruc-
tions to labor market mobility within the EU, research-
ers discuss the problems that workers have in adapting to 
a different cultural environment and in finding suitable 
housing. Compared to initiatives to resolve such prob-
lems, an initiative to improve pension programs would 
be a more effective policy instrument because it could 
be implemented by policy makers and it would not be 
as difficult as overcoming workers’ cultural preferences. 
Financial or material goods can be provided, but sub-
stantial responsibility for becoming integrated and set-
tling into a new culture or living environment falls on 
the individual workers. In contrast, it is easier for policy 
makers to change the pension system to encourage mi-
grant workers. Because pensions are deferred salaries, it 
is simply necessary to offer workers the best prospects 
for future pension payments. Pensions could thus be 
used as a policy instrument to attract working-age per-
sons to jobs that are available in different locations in 
the EU. This principle could apply to tenure jobs and 
to temporary jobs, and it could help to fill labor mar-
ket vacancies in the EU that are currently hard to fill. It 
is only necessary to define what best prospects means. 
In every situation, from a worker’s perspective, policies 
that allow the accumulation of pension savings indepen-
dent of any EU-employer are the best choice (see Borgy 
& Chojnicki, 2009; Jarret, 2011).
This brings us to pension portability in its easiest 
form, namely, a feasible pension scheme for individual 
workers that involves mandatory but relatively risk-
free saving. “Risk-free” should be understood as a level 
of risk that is far less than the risk that applies to other 
forms of investments (e.g., investments in shares, bonds 
or derivatives). I analyze the parameter settings that 
would be necessary for such a pension scheme to meet 
or exceed the pension needs that a worker will face at 
retirement. I then return to the possible differences or 
disadvantages of pension systems that are individual 
or collective or that take some other form. This section 
can be summarized as follows: An individual pension 
scheme  that  would  be  available  throughout  the  EU 
would be conducive to labor mobility and would thus 
contribute to the effective functioning of the EU labor 
market because it would help to encourage workers to 
cross borders to accept jobs.
Illustrative example of an individual 
pension scheme for Mr. X
This section clarifies the specific meaning of an in-
dividual pension scheme in this paper by using an ex-
ample of a representative worker in the EU. I call this 
person Mr. X.
Mr. X starts working at the age of 22 and retires at 
the official retirement age of 67 years. He starts with 
an annual salary of € 20,000 that increases by 2% each 
year. That increase in salary is equal to the annual in-
flation rate during the full 45 years of his working life. 
According to wage bargaining agreements or regula-
tions, Mr. X saves 7% of his salary and his employer 
contributes twice that amount. Mr. X and his employer 
deposit these pension contributions in a tax-free sav-
ings account in a bank. The savings account carries Mr. 
X’s name, so Mr. X. is the sole owner. However, Mr. X 
has no access to the funds deposited until he reaches 
the standard retirement age. This is a so-called blocked 
account. The owner of the account, and anybody else, 
can deposit money into the account, but neither the 
owner, nor anyone else, can withdraw money until the 
fixed savings term (which coincides with the retire-
ment age) has passed. After the fixed term has passed, 
the owner (Mr. X in this case) is entitled to use the 
money and, in this example, his savings will have ac-
crued at a fixed interest rate of 4% each year.
Figure 1 (dotted line) shows the level of Mr. X’s salary 
during a working life of 45 years, from 22 to 67 years of 
age. At the age of 66, his salary is almost €49,000. This 
indicates that the salary more than doubled due to the 
annual 2% salary-growth during 45 years from year-on-
year increases. Figure 1 (dark line) also illustrates the ac-
crued funds in the savings account. At a retirement age 
of 67, these funds will have reached €720,000 (as indi-
cated by the right axis). This nest egg consists of the pen-
sion contributions and the interest paid on the savings, 
which amounts to roughly 300,000 to 400,000 euros. 
Therefore, the total interest payments are higher than 
the pension contributions. This shows the importance 
of receiving compound interest  over a long period. 26 Marga Peeters
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At the age of 67, Mr. X’s account is unblocked, and he 
starts withdrawing money at an annual rate of 70% 
of  his  last  earned  salary.  That  amounts  to  €35,000 
(=€49,000*0.7). This is his pension benefit (see the line 
in Figure 1). In the subsequent years, he withdraws 
the same amount as the previous year, but with an in-
crease of 2% to compensate for consumer price infla-
tion. He can do this up until he reaches the age of 94, 
when his savings reach zero. As the graph illustrates, 
the decumulation of his savings occurs in a non-linear 
way because the remaining money in the savings ac-
count continues to earn a 4% interest rate. Because of 
the fixed long-term savings plan, this interest rate has 
remained the same over the entire working and retire-
ment period.
This last feature is important. It indicates that the 
saved contributions are long-term savings and there-
fore accrue at a relatively high interest rate. Mr. X saves 
the first pension contribution earned at the age of 22 
for 45 years. He also saves the pension contribution 
earned at age 23 for 45 years because at the age of 67, 
he only consumes a small sum of money, and this suf-
fices relative to all the interest accrued on his first sal-
ary (earned at the age of 22). 
Mr. X does not necessarily have to work his whole 
life in the same country or with the same employer. 
The only relevant parameters in this example are his 
starting wage (€20,000), the length of his working life 
(45 years), his annual salary increase (2%), the pension 
contributions (21% of his salary, of which 7% is con-
tributed by the employee and 14% by the employer), 
the interest rate on savings (4%) and the replacement 
rate at retirement (70% of the last earned salary). The 
outcome is that Mr. X has secure pension benefits for 
more  than  25  years.  With  consumer  price  inflation 
equaling the nominal increase in the salaries as well as 
the pension benefits, real income remains at the same 
level during Mr. X’s whole life. The extent to which 
various combinations of these parameters could lead 
to higher outcomes in the entire life-cycle income is 
examined in the next section. 
The  pension  scheme  described  in  the  above  ex-
ample is individual because Mr. X possesses all his ac-
cumulated funds in a bank account that is only in his 
name. The scheme is relatively risk-free because Mr. 
X receives a fixed interest rate, independent of finan-
cial  market  conditions  or  other  uncertainty  factors. 
Furthermore, this scheme is mandatory because Mr. 
X is required to save for his pension and cannot use 
the accumulated funds for consumption purposes be-
fore his retirement. Finally, to use the terminology of 
pension literature and pension policy discussions, the 
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Figure 1. Mr. X’s salaries, pension benefits and accumulation of pension funds.
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employer and employee have negotiated the pension 
contributions and not the future pension benefits, so 
the scheme is a defined contribution (DC) plan and 
not a defined benefit (DB) plan. In these respects, this 
scheme is thus rather basic. 
It is clear that this example contains many simpli-
fying assumptions. In practice, for example, the level 
of inflation and the level of interest rates will not re-
main stable for such a long period. Employees working 
across borders may even face currency depreciations. 
However, all of these issues apply in the same way in 
the  current  real  world  without  individual  pension 
schemes. The main point here is that the individual 
savings account in a bank is a much better alternative 
financially than the current patchwork systems for em-
ployees who cross borders to find work.  
Straightforward specifications and 
scenario analyses
This section specifies, in general terms, Mr. X’s lifetime 
income. The resulting inequalities are  used to show 
pension outcomes under different parameter settings.
Individual pension savings specification
The pension contributions saved in year t, denoted as 
St , are based on the initial gross wage, W0 , that grows 
with   and that depends on the rate of pension contri-
butions  . It follows that
  (1)
With  the nominal savings interest rate, the accumu-
lated pension savings at the end of the working life of 
T years are: 
  (2)
Assuming the pension period to be K years, the stream 
of the pension benefits Pt at the age of retirement at 
period T reads as follows: 
  (3)
with r the nominal discount rate. In the example of Mr. 
X, as discussed in the previous section, this discount 
rate equals the nominal savings interest rate, so  . 
I generalize in this specification and allow for the pos-
sibility that Mr. X could dispose of his savings after his 
retirement. Therefore, the savings after retirement are 
no longer long-term savings, so they may mature at 
a lower interest rate, hence,  .
The pension replacement rate,  , defines the first 
pension benefit in relation to the last earned wage, WT. 
Adjusted for consumer price inflation,
  (4a)
and in the subsequent years, this first pension benefit 
grows again at the inflation rate π, so
 for t = 2,3.. K.   (4b)
It should hold that individuals save as much money 
during their working lives as they need for their retire-
ment. I will consider this a requirement and take the 
retirement age as the measurement point in time (i.e., 
year T). The total lifetime income Ω in year T (i.e., the 
stream of pension savings at retirement age T minus 
the stream of pension needs during the K retirement 
years) should thus be positive, that is 
: 0 T T PensionSavings PensionNeeds Ω = − ≥   (5)
Substituting (2) and (3) in (5) and subsequently sub-
stituting (1) and (4a)-(4b) for S and P, respectively, it 
then holds that
⇔
⇔
with   and   .   (6)
This last inequality states that the initial pension sav-
ings  should precisely match or exceed the pen-
sion benefit paid out in the retirement year  , 
where this pension saving is accrued to the retirement 28 Marga Peeters
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moment by the first term in curly brackets, and this 
pension benefit is discounted with the second term in 
curly brackets. Logically, the higher the wage growth 
 during the working life, the higher the accrual of 
pension funds (the term to the left of the inequality 
sign). In the same vein, the higher the pension ben-
efit growth  , the higher the pension needs (the term 
to the right of the equality sign). However, while the 
nominal savings rate ( )  pushes savings upward (the 
term to the left of the equality sign), higher nominal 
savings rates after retirement (r) depress the pension 
needs  because  the  remaining  savings  accrue  more 
quickly. As an extreme case, which is illustrative, as-
suming  , it follows that 
This implies that the initial pension saving multiplied 
by the number of working years should precisely match 
or exceed the initial pension benefit multiplied by the 
number of retirement years. It is the example of a non-
growing economy without inflation, wage growth or 
interest payments.
Upon further reflection, it is clear that this case is 
not so extreme because the same inequality holds if the 
(wage or price) inflation on income equals the nominal 
interest rate during an individual’s working and retire-
ment life (i.e.,   and  ). This is the case where 
the return on savings vanishes due to relatively high 
wage or pension-benefit inflation.
Because it holds that the pension contribution at the 
moment of retirement is simply the first earned pen-
sion contribution accrued with the wage growth (i.e., 
), substitution in equation (6) after 
division of both sides by  gives
⇔
  (7)
Interestingly, this shows that the initial wage plays no 
role in making the pension savings exactly match or 
exceed the pension needs. This is because a person 
with a high wage will also receive a proportionately 
high pension benefit, and a person with a relatively 
low wage will receive a relatively low pension benefit. 
However, the parameters that indicate the amount of 
pension contribution  and the pension replacement 
rate   as a proportion of the initial wage play a cru-
cial role. Apart from these two parameters, there are 
six other key parameters.
To summarize, inequality (7) contains the following 
parameters:
1.  The pension contribution rate  .
2.  The wage growth rate  .
3.  The length of the working life T.
4.  The nominal rate of return on savings  .
5.  The pension replacement rate  .
6.  The growth rate of pension benefits  .
7.  The length of the retirement period K.
8.  The discount rate of pension payments r.
In the examples below, I assume that some of these pa-
rameters are fixed, and I show outcomes for differing 
values for the other parameters. 
Pension outcomes under different scenario 
settings
Figure 2 shows preliminary findings, where (7) was 
used at equality. I first show the trade-off between the 
number of working years to retirement years, on the 
one hand, and ration of the pension contribution to 
replacement rate, on the other hand. The more years 
that a person works, the lower the pension contribu-
tion rate that this person needs, ceteris paribus. In the 
same vein, the more years that a person needs to re-
ceive pension benefits after retiring, the lower the pen-
sion replacement rate must be, ceteris paribus, in order 
for the equality to hold. To illustrate this in an example 
with numbers, there is a dotted line at the point on the 
horizontal  axis  where  T/K=40/20=2  that  represents   
a situation where the individual worker wants to ac-
cumulate pension savings for a retirement period of 20 
years during a working life period of 40 years (case A). 
Following the dotted line upwards, one reaches the dark 
line that represents the isoquant that gives the border 
between the area on the left (where the inequality (7) 
does not hold) and the area on the right where it does 
hold. Then, following the dotted line to the left, one 
reaches the vertical axis at point 0.27. This is the pen-Vizja Press&IT www.ce.vizja.pl
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sion contribution for replacement rate. Assuming that 
the replacement rate is 0.7, this implies that the pen-
sion contribution is 19%. This is less than the pension 
contribution in the example with Mr. X in the previous 
section. With the employer sharing the contributions,   
and  assuming  that  the  employer  contributions  are 
twice as high as the worker contributions, this implies 
that the worker only has to save slightly more than 6% 
of his wage rate. Thus, a worker with a retirement pe-
riod of 20 years and a replacement rate of 0.7 needs to 
work at least 40 years if the total pension contributions 
paid in by the worker and the employer amount to 19% 
of the wage rate. If the worker works less than 40 years, 
the total pension contribution paid in by the worker 
and the employer should be more than 19%. 
If this worker only worked 20 years and then had 
a  retirement  period  of  20  years,  the  contributions 
would  need  to  increase  considerably.  In  this  case,   
T/K=20/20=1.  This  shows  (as  marked  by  the  dark 
line) that the pension contribution should be at least 
0.7 times the replacement rate. This is case B in the 
figure. Assuming again a replacement rate of 0.7, this 
implies that the pension contribution would have to 
rise to almost 50%. This would be slightly more than 
16% for the employee if the employer contributed 33%. 
Interestingly, if the employee worked 30 years and had 
a retirement period of 30 years, the situation at the iso-
quant with the dotted line would still hold. See case C. 
In this case, the ratio of the pension contribution to the 
replacement rate would drop to 0.6, and a pension con-
tribution of 40% would hold for the replacement rate 
to remain at 0.7. Working for 10 years longer is thus 
proportionally more beneficial because the accumula-
tion of funds significantly increases, and this ensures 
the payment of pension benefits for a much longer pe-
riod (see also Table 1).
As can be seen in Table 1 (which presents an over-
view of the required pension contribution rate in the 
case of different parameter settings), there are ample 
cases where this contribution is at or below 45% (that 
is 15% for the employee if the employer pays 30%). In 
the standard scenario, the parameters are set at T=45, 
K=30,  ,   and  . The savings 
interest rate during the working life varies from 0% to 
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Table 1. Required pension contribution rate with different parameter settings
savings interest rate ρ=0.0 ρ=0.02 ρ=0.04 ρ=0.06 ρ=0.08
number of working years
T=30 0.79 0.60 0.45 0.33 0.23
T=35 0.71 0.52 0.37 0.25 0.17
T=40 0.65 0.45 0.30 0.19 0.12
T=45 0.60 0.40 0.25 0.15 0.09
number of retirement years
K=20 0.55 0.42 0.31 0.23 0.16
K=25 0.68 0.52 0.38 0.28 0.20
K=30 0.79 0.60 0.45 0.33 0.23
K=35 0.90 0.69 0.51 0.37 0.27
pension replacement rate
μ=0.5 0.57 0.43 0.32 0.23 0.17
μ=0.6 0.68 0.52 0.39 0.28 0.20
μ=0.7 0.79 0.60 0.45 0.33 0.23
μ=0.8 0.91 0.69 0.51 0.37 0.27
salary growth          
δ=0.01 0.70 0.52 0.38 0.28 0.19
δ=0.02 0.79 0.60 0.45 0.33 0.23
δ=0.03 0.90 0.69 0.52 0.39 0.28
δ=0.04 1.01 0.79 0.60 0.45 0.33
pension benefit growth        
π=0.01 0.69 0.52 0.39 0.28 0.20
π=0.02 0.79 0.60 0.45 0.33 0.23
π=0.03 0.92 0.70 0.52 0.38 0.27
π=0.04 1.07 0.82 0.61 0.44 0.32
savings rate on pension funds during retirement
r=0.01 1.07 0.82 0.61 0.44 0.32
r=0.02 0.92 0.70 0.52 0.38 0.27
r=0.03 0.79 0.60 0.45 0.33 0.23
r=0.04 0.69 0.53 0.39 0.28 0.20
Note: The standard scenario sets the parameters at T=45, K=30, μ=0.7, δ= π=0.02 and r=0.03. Values in bold highlight the cases 
where the pension contribution is at or lower than 45%.Vizja Press&IT www.ce.vizja.pl
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8% from one column to the next in steps of two per-
centage points.  As can be seen in the top row, a work-
ing life of 30 years and a savings interest rate of 4% 
requires a pension contribution of 45%. Increasing the 
working life to 45 years allows this contribution to de-
crease to 25%. Increasing the working life thus signifi-
cantly decreases the necessary pension contribution. At 
this interest rate on savings, if the working life is kept at 
45 years but the replacement rate is lowered from 0.7 
to 0.5 of the last earned salary, the necessary pension 
contribution declines from 45% to 32%, as can be seen 
in the third panel. Combined scenarios are particularly 
interesting. For example, with a 4% savings interest 
rate, a  working life of 45 years and a replacement rate 
of 0.5, the required pension contribution falls to only 
18% (not shown in Table 1, but this can be computed 
by interpolation). Only cases where the savings inter-
est rate is zero are impossible in a practical sense.  In 
such cases, the pension contribution would need to be 
exorbitantly high because the accumulation of funds 
would stagnate. Most other situations could be accept-
able, even if  was only 2% (i.e.,  ).
In real life, however, an individual worker cannot in-
fluence certain factors. Workers are generally unable to 
influence savings and inflation rates or even the rate of 
salary growth. However, a worker can choose to work 
longer and can agree to a lower pension replacement 
rate. If it is assumed that a worker does not want to pay 
an individual contribution together with the contribu-
tion by his employer to achieve a pension contribution 
rate of more than 45%, he can calculate the working life 
and pension replacement rate combination that meets 
this requirement. One possibility would be for him to 
work 35 years and to receive 80% of his last earned sala-
ry as pension benefits after retirement. As an alternative, 
he could accept a compromise where he would receive 
a pension replacement of 50% of his last earned salary 
but he would only need to work for 25 years. This can be 
seen in Figure 3, where the dark line gives all possible 
combinations of the replacement rate and the number 
of working years for  . Opting for a lower pension 
contribution rate of 30% automatically implies that the 
worker must work longer to receive the same replace-
ment rate or must agree to a  lower replacement rate 
after the same number of working years. 
These calculations show that in terms of feasibility, 
there are various options available to individual workers 
to ensure that they will have enough income throughout 
their lives even if the savings interest rates are moderate. 
Moreover, in view of the monetary policy objective of 
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price stability in the European Economic and Monetary 
Union, the inflation and nominal interest rates tend to 
move in line with each other, so there is little risk of 
a loss of purchasing power. If inflation increases, (pol-
icy) interest rates tend to increase. This keeps the value 
of the savings in the fund constant. For this reason, the 
pension benefits retain their value in real terms.
Benefits of individual pension 
schemes for workers
The example in section 3 illustrated how Mr. X’s pen-
sion scheme could work during his life. The  general-
izations presented in the previous section again under-
line the possibility of pension savings being sufficient 
for a long retirement period of even 30 years or more 
if reasonable pension contributions were made under 
various parameters of savings rate, inflation and the 
replacement rate. From the viewpoint of the worker, 
there are obvious advantages to this individual pension 
scheme approach in comparison to a collective pen-
sion scheme. Moreover, other  characteristics associ-
ated with savings offer particular advantages.
First, the accumulation and, after retirement, de-
cumulation  of  funds  is  transparent  for  the  worker. 
Placing the funds in an individual bank account that 
the worker owns prevents anyone else from interfer-
ing, deducting money or changing the lump sum apart 
from the interest payments that are deposited in the 
blocked account by the bank. This contrasts sharply 
with the pension schemes that exist in many EU coun-
tries that do not give workers any way to see how the 
nominal values of their pension schemes are increas-
ing during their working lives. It is often only when 
the retirement age is approaching that workers become 
aware of their pending pension benefits. Besides mak-
ing workers more aware, increased transparency can 
also help them decide whether they need to work more 
years or fewer years to meet their future income needs 
(see also Holzmann and Palacios, 2001). In addition, if 
workers are motivated to leave bequests for survivors, 
there will be a personal incentive for them to work 
more. The lump sum of money that the worker sees 
accumulating in the bank account is an accurate reflec-
tion of what has been earned and what will be paid out 
once the account is unblocked at retirement.
In this regard, the comparison in Sinha (2002) of the 
Latin American individual pension accounts with the 
US system that claimed to achieve a 6% average rate 
of return is relevant. Even if stock market investments 
achieve a higher rate of return, affiliates of a pension 
fund that have 100 percent investment in stocks may 
not realize the same rate of return because the ubiq-
uitous management fees can consume much (if not 
all) of the gain. See also Barr and Diamond (2006) and 
Hinz et al. (2000) on the magnitude of administration 
costs associated with individual accounts.  It is also ap-
propriate to point out that a 6% stock market return 
is overly optimistic. That rate did apply in the period 
from 1921-1996 is the U.S., but other stock markets 
worldwide had  a far lower return even when dividends 
were included (see Jorion & Goetzmann, 1999).
Second, by saving in a simple bank savings account, 
the worker incurs almost no costs. The total charge for 
the complete administration of an ordinary bank sav-
ings account amounted to  10 to 30 euros per year in 
2010. There is no reason for banks to charge higher ad-
ministration fees  in the case of individual savings ac-
counts because these accounts are blocked, so the banks   
possess each worker’s funds over a long period until 
the worker’s retirement age. When the money is used 
for other purposes, the bank, and not the worker, must 
assume all the risk. The pension savings should also be 
fully covered by the national deposit guarantee system. 
Because there are no investments in equity or bonds, 
the bank does not incur any trading costs or additional 
costs for managing a portfolio of investments. The av-
erage operational costs of collective pension funds in 
14 countries of the EU range from 0.1% of the total 
assets in Denmark and Portugal to more than 1.0% 
in the Czech Republic and in Spain (see Graph 7 in 
Peeters, 2011). The simple average is 0.5%. This is rela-
tively high in comparison with the fixed costs of 10 to 
30 euros a year for a bank savings account. These costs 
significantly depress the returns on the invested funds 
(comparable  with  our  in  the  previous  section). 
Moreover, the OECD does not yet have information 
about the costs of managing pension funds in the re-
maining 13 countries of the EU. This may indicate that 
the average costs in the EU are even higher.
Third, with individual pension schemes, workers 
will no longer be subject to the whims of a govern-
ment or of other pension fund managers during or 
after retirement. This independence is a valuable ad-
vantage that does not apply to most pension schemes Vizja Press&IT www.ce.vizja.pl
33 Better Safe than Sorry - Individual Risk-free Pension Schemes in the European Union
in the EU. If workers are part of a scheme operated by 
the government, there is a risk that the pension funds 
could be used to fill the holes of public finance deficits, 
even though this is not ethical and is actually illegal 
in some cases. However, history has shown that min-
isters of finance who are in need of funds and under 
pressure by the public can be tempted to use pension 
funds to pay for current expenditures. The dire state of 
public finances that is related to the sovereign debt cri-
sis in the economies at the rim of the EU increases the 
likelihood that this could happen (see Van Groezen et 
al., 2009). If there is a chance that a government might 
need to use pension funds for public funding, that 
would give the government a greater incentive to keep 
its workers in the dark about the state of their pension 
schemes. In countries where the accumulated sum of 
money in pension funds is governed by the managers 
of other funds, there are also rules that these manag-
ers can change over the course of time. For example, 
governments may decide to stop indexing the growth 
of the pension benefits at consumer price inflation, 
or they may change the pension replacement rate. In 
times of financial crises, when the possibility of de-
pressed investment outcomes and the rising demands 
of  an  ageing  population  cause  the  expenditures  of 
pension funds to exceed the income, there is pressure 
on fund managers to change the rules. A change of 
rules  is  particularly  problematic  for  workers  when 
it occurs after they have retired because the workers 
are then unable to replenish their income by working 
more to save more. 
The conclusion that emerges from a consideration 
of  these  three  benefits  for  the  worker  of  individual 
pension schemes is that it is better to be safe than sorry. 
It is better for workers to take the safer option and have 
a simple savings account where the accumulation of 
funds during their working years is transparent so it 
will be possible for them to adjust their labor market 
participation if that is needed. It is better for workers 
to be aware of the costs and outcomes of investment 
options so they can choose the option that offers low 
investment costs with a fixed return rather than to in-
cur unknown costs in exchange for the possibility of 
high returns (such as investments in equity), only to be 
sorry when they retire and the pension benefits turn 
out to be lower than expected. Last, it is better for pen-
sion funds to be independent of governments or other 
fund managers so they can guarantee that no unpleas-
ant surprises will occur when the individual workers 
are no longer able to augment their income.
So why not implement an individual 
pension scheme?
After reviewing the costs and the benefits of an indi-
vidual pension schemes in the previous sections, this 
section will now discuss the counterarguments. What 
are the reasons why an individual might not favor an 
individual pension scheme? 
First,  investing  in  a  collective  scheme  with  invest-
ments that are not risk free can result in higher returns 
and, as a consequence, can lower the pension contribu-
tions that are required to reach a lump sum before re-
tirement. However, it has been shown that the return 
on pension contributions deposited by the worker and 
the employer in an individual savings account is, on 
average, no more than 2% lower than the return on 
the same contribution deposited with a government or 
some other pension fund (institutional investors, pen-
sion funds, insurance companies). Looking at the gross 
returns from a historical perspective, collective funds 
only rarely attained an average return of 6%, whereas 
even in times of worldwide low interest rates, the in-
terest rate on a long-term savings account (10 years 
or longer) was 4.0%. Savings deposited in a blocked 
bank account, where the funds are not accessible until 
retirement, often means even longer fixed terms and, 
thus, even higher interest rates. Apart from Denmark, 
the global recession years have led to remarkably low 
returns on the money invested in collective pensions, 
averaging only 0.8% for the other 16 EU countries (see 
Figure 8 in Peeters, 2011). This evidence suggests that 
the risk of missing out on the higher returns that are of-
ten available for more risky investments is outweighed 
by the risk of unacceptable losses (see Sinha, 2002).
A second argument against individual (risk-free) pen-
sion schemes could be that such schemes entail an un-
desirable shift away from the social insurance approach 
with its tacit solidarity across and within generations. For 
example, the individual pension schemes do not provide 
any insurance against the risk of illness and the resulting 
loss of human capital through illness. However, these 
forms of insurance are more related to sick pay that can 
be provided more appropriately by either the employer 
or  the  government.    In  most  developed  economies, 34 Marga Peeters
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these forms of insurance are part of the wider social 
security system and are not covered by pension funds. 
Insuring against the loss of earnings through illness is 
expensive. Moreover, solidarity in relation to these risks 
is a social issue that is not necessarily the responsibil-
ity of the individual employee. While collective pension 
schemes can relieve borrowing constraints and facili-
tate intergenerational risk sharing, they usually impose 
uniform rules on the heterogeneous participants (cited 
from Bovenberg et al., 2007; see also Barr & Diamond, 
2006). Pension saving over a lifetime, however, is largely 
in the hands of the worker. Workers should not be pun-
ished disproportionally relative to non-workers in view 
of demographic developments and for the sake of the 
functioning  of  the  common-market  single  currency. 
Moreover,  as  Holzmann  and  Palacios  (2001)  argue, 
individual accounts are a better way to deal with labor 
market incentives and changing family patterns, such as 
divorces, multiple marriages or relationships over the 
life cycle, widowhood, and the resulting need for in-
dependent old-age security for non-working partners. 
Under an individual account system, the resources ac-
cumulated during the period of a marriage can easily 
be divided after a divorce, combined with each partner’s 
own and prior contributions and interest received, and 
supplemented by public resources in a transparent man-
ner (e.g.,  for periods of child rearing).
A third argument against an individual (risk-free) 
pension scheme is the risk of insufficient coverage and 
longevity. In the examples presented in the previous 
sections, one of the assumptions was that workers have 
perfect foresight and also know how long they will live. 
If pension savings accrued during a working life are 
estimated to cover 20 retirement years and the worker 
lives much longer than that, there will clearly be a fi-
nancial gap at an age when this is difficult to resolve. 
This is a real but surmountable problem. Policy makers 
could impose the life-expectancy age as a guideline for 
workers and provide the few people who live beyond 
this set age with an entitlement to a special social secu-
rity benefit. Alternatively, workers could be legally re-
quired to save for a minimum of 30 years of retirement. 
This period is achievable under reasonable parameter 
settings, as shown by the calculations in section 4. 
A fourth argument against individual (risk-free) pen-
sion schemes is that some people are not capable of doing 
their own financial planning for such a long period as 
a lifespan. This objective is often raised but the argu-
ment should be regarded as rather weak. Learning to 
plan is an important skill, and leaving this responsibil-
ity to others often results in less attractive outcomes. 
In the case of savings, as outlined in the previous sec-
tions, there are only a few parameters that need to 
be decided upon (see also Milevsky, 2009; Pozen & 
Hamacher, 2011). The pension contribution rate, as 
well as the workers and employers’ share, should be 
part of the wage-negotiation process. Some kind of 
pension scheme is already mandatory because there 
must be savings and the money in the savings account 
must be inaccessible (blocked), so there are no deci-
sions to make in this regard. The worker does not have 
to make any investment strategy decisions because the 
bank will save the worker’s funds at the highest interest 
rate for each payment until the worker’s retirement. 
There  are  no  other  arguments  against  individual 
pension schemes in comparison with riskier collective 
schemes. (I abstain from including in this paper any 
discussion of term life insurance, which would benefit 
a worker’s survivors.) In case a worker dies, the funds 
saved in the individual account will be at the disposal 
of the survivors at the retirement age of the worker. 
A term life insurance policy is extremely costly (up to 
2.5% of the contributions is charged for management 
fees), but it is often unnecessary in cases where the sur-
vivor is able to work, is entitled to other (social secu-
rity) funds, or if there are no survivors. Furthermore, 
general risks such as the risk of inflation affect indi-
vidual savings accounts and other pension schemes in 
the same way. 
Summary, conclusions and policy 
recommendations
Up  until  now,  the  economies  of  the  EU  have  been 
building  collective  pension  funds.  These  programs 
were initiated at a time when there was a great need 
for solidarity and intergenerational risk-sharing. The 
movement toward these two national goals, separately 
or in combination, was in place well before the start of 
the European Economic and Monetary Union.
However, times have changed. The EU now also has 
a monetary union. The loss of national discretion on 
monetary policy, exchange rates and interest rate in-
struments, and the absence of a common fiscal policy, 
means that the functioning of the labor market is now of Vizja Press&IT www.ce.vizja.pl
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paramount importance. In the absence of a fully func-
tioning fiscal union, only labor mobility can cushion the 
effects of the asymmetric shocks that have hit some but 
not all of the economies of the monetary union. 
 In addition, the member states are ageing because of 
demographic trends. The working-age populations are 
shrinking while the number of elderly dependents in the 
economy continues to grow. This demographic change 
puts pressure on the working-age population, and it will 
increase in the coming decades. The working-age popu-
lation must adapt to provide the goods and services that 
are needed in an aging society, and it will have to work 
more to pay for the living expenses incurred by a larger 
generation of retirees. In addition, workers should not 
forget to save for their own retirement. To help them 
achieve  this,  the  working-age  populations  should  be 
given incentives to be flexible in the labor market.
Although labor mobility in the EU has significantly 
increased, it is still low. One impediment to greater la-
bor mobility is the non-portability (or costly portabil-
ity) of pension schemes for workers who accept jobs 
across  national  borders.  Rather  than  preserving  the 
present impediments, it would be better to facilitate 
labor mobility and offer incentives for EU workers to 
cross borders for work. This change would help the EU 
to function more efficiently, and it would help to miti-
gate the above-described consequences of demograph-
ic change. In comparison with other factors that affect 
labor mobility, initiatives to improve the portability of 
pensions would be one of the most feasible and effec-
tive policy instruments that EU policy-makers could 
use to increase labor mobility.
This paper presents many arguments for moving to-
ward individual pension schemes, particularly (but not 
exclusively) for workers who move across national bor-
ders for work. An individual pension scheme would be 
inherently portable across EU-borders. Although this 
type of pension scheme does currently exist on a very 
small  scale,  most  employers  in  the  EU  force  their 
workers to participate in collective schemes. Workers 
cannot opt out of these collective schemes unless they 
quit their jobs. Once a worker leaves a job, however, 
transferring any funds that have accumulated in the 
collective pension plan across national borders in the 
EU is almost impossible or is extremely costly.
The idea of individual pension schemes has implica-
tions for the balance between government intervention 
and freedom of choice, which is often discussed in the 
relevant literature in terms of social democratic versus 
neo-liberal values. Currently, most first-pillar (but also 
second-pillar) collective schemes accept a government-
prescribed straightjacket. If the terms are not prescribed 
directly by the government, it is an intermediary in-
surance company or pension company that makes the 
choices for the employee. The individual scheme that is 
advocated in this paper does not fit in this system. On 
the other hand, it also does not fit in the freedom of 
choice category because paying pension contributions 
would still be mandatory, and the worker would not be 
free to manage the funds that accumulate through the 
mandatory savings. The ownership of the funds would 
remain in the hands of the worker, however, and the 
value would be transparent and portable.
In  addition  to  enhancing  labor  market  mobil-
ity, a transition to individual pension schemes would 
bring  two  other  macroeconomic  benefits.  First,  the 
individual character of the scheme will create the right 
incentives and make working-age people who do not 
participate in the labor market, or who participate only 
on a part-time basis, aware of the need to participate 
and to save more money in the funds so they will have 
enough money to meet their needs after retirement. 
This incentive to participate (fully) in the labor market 
could lead to more job vacancies being filled. Second, 
individual pension accounts can improve the social in-
surance aspect of public pension schemes by making 
them financially sustainable and even more redistribu-
tive (see Holzmann & Palacios, 2001).
Furthermore, this paper shows that a worker can 
easily achieve a level of savings that is sufficient to 
provide reasonable pension benefits over a retirement 
period of 30 years if employers contribute their share 
of the pension savings. For workers who retire at the 
age of 67, 30 retirement years should take them well 
beyond the normal life expectancy. The nominal pen-
sion benefit paid out from a solid bank account would 
be fully guaranteed, and it would not be vulnerable to 
interference from others.  
In this paper, I also show that an individual pen-
sion scheme has three main advantages for employees. 
First, workers can clearly see what they will get. Sec-
ond, the financial costs of managing the funds are ex-
tremely small. Third, the workers are assured of receiv-
ing all the benefits accrued on their lifetime earnings 36 Marga Peeters
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regardless of the whims of the government or other 
fund managers. 
Because the difference between the returns on in-
vestments  in  financial  markets  and  the  returns  and 
bank savings accounts has diminished over the last 
decade, and because public finances are currently in 
trouble, it would not be reasonable to argue on the 
basis of the potential return on investments that work-
ers should be forced to participate in risky collective 
investment schemes. 
A remaining question that must be answered relates 
to the steps that EU policy-makers would have to take 
to implement individual pension schemes throughout 
the entire EU. This question is easy to answer because 
this new system could be phased in gradually, and the 
old patchwork system of pension schemes for employ-
ees who work in different EU countries over the course 
of their working lives could be phased out in the course 
of time. In this way, the macro-economic cost of mov-
ing completely to the new system can  also be limited.
Every EU-citizen who takes a job and works in a dif-
ferent country within the EU should be allowed to open 
a long-term interest-bearing bank savings account that 
accumulates the monthly pension contributions. These 
contributions  would  come  from  the  employee  and 
from the employer, but the precise shares of the pen-
sion contributions that would come from the employee 
and the employer would be determined through the 
job negotiation process. The savings account should 
be an EU-wide tax-free, long-term interest-bearing ac-
count that is blocked until the moment the EU-citizen 
reaches the retirement age of, let us say, 67. This would 
be what is called a blocked account because no money 
could be withdrawn until the owner reached the age of 
67, but the value of the account would always be visible 
to the owner of the account so he or she would be able 
to keep track of the contribution payments from the 
employer and interest payments from the bank over 
the course of time. 
Legislation is needed to ensure that banks, or other 
institutions that function as banks under EU banking 
supervision, offer these blocked bank accounts under 
conditions that protect the funds of (former) employ-
ees. They must be required to offer these bank accounts 
at only minor costs because they will have huge sums 
of long-term savings in their possession and their only 
obligation will be to pay the long-term interest rate. 
This interest rate should be as high as possible for the 
entire amount in the account from the moment each 
payment is deposited until the date of the workers’ re-
tirement age. The total funds in these pension schemes 
accounts should be covered by the national deposit 
guarantee system to ensure that they are risk free. After 
the age of 67, the EU citizen should receive a monthly 
payment from this accumulated wealth for a predeter-
mined number of years. Because our calculations show 
that thirty years is feasible, the payments could con-
tinue until the former employee reaches the age of 97. 
For individuals who live beyond this age, a safety net 
should be in place. 
At the discretion of the national governments, it will 
be possible for the EU nations to follow this stepwise 
implementation  of  the  individual  bank-savings-ac-
count pension accumulation plan throughout the EU.
References
Adema,  W.,  &  Ladaique,  M.  (2009).  How  expensive 
is  the  welfare  state?  Gross  and  net  indicators  in 
the  OECD  social  expenditures  database  (SOCX) 
(Working Papers No. 92). OECD Social, Employ-
ment and Migration.
Arza, C., & Kohli, M. (Eds.). (2008). Pension reform 
in Europe: Politics, policies and outcome. London: 
Routledge.
Barr, N. & Diamond, P. A. (2006). The economics of 
pensions. Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 22(1), 
15-39.
Borgy,  V.  &  Chojnicki,  X.  (2009).  Labor  migration: 
Macroeconomic  and  demographic  outlook  for 
Europe and neighbourhood regions. International 
Economics, 3(119), 115-153.  
Börsch-Supan,  A.  (2006).  European  welfare  state  re-
gimes  and  their  generosity  towards  the  elderly. 
(Working Paper No. 479). The Levy Economics 
Institute of Bard College. 
Bovenberg, A. L., Koijen, R. S. J., Nijman, T. E., & Teul-
ings, C. N. (2007). Saving and investing over the 
life cycle and the role of collective pension funds. 
De Economist, 155(4), 347-415.
Cavelaars, P., & Hessel, J. (2007). Regional labour mar-
ket mobility in the European Union: Adjustment 
mechanism or disturbance? (DNB Working Paper 
No.  137).  Netherlands  Central  Bank,  Research 
Department.Vizja Press&IT www.ce.vizja.pl
37 Better Safe than Sorry - Individual Risk-free Pension Schemes in the European Union
European  Commission.  (2012).  An  agenda  for  ade-
quate, safe and sustainable pensions, White Paper.
European  Commission.  (2011).  Demography  report 
2010 – Older, more numerous and diverse Europe-
ans (KE-ET-10-001-EN-C). Luxembourg: Publi-
cations Office of the European Union.
European  Commission.  (2010a).  Green  Paper  –  to-
wards  adequate,  sustainable  and  safe  European 
pension systems (SEC(2010)830). Brussels: Euro-
pean Comission
European Commission. (2010b). Progress and key chal-
lenges in the delivery of adequate and sustainable 
pensions in Europe (A Joint Report on Pensions) 
(European Economy Occasional Papers 71, KC-
AH-10-071-EN-N).  Brussels:  European  Com-
mission  Directorate-General  for  Economic  and 
Financial Affairs Publications 
Hinz, R., Rudolph, H., Antolin, P., & Yermo, J. (Eds.). 
(2010).  Evaluating  the  financial  performance  of 
pension funds. Washington, DC: The World Bank. 
Holzmann, R., & Palacios, R. (2001). Individual ac-
counts as social insurance: A World Bank perspec-
tive  (Discussion  Paper  No.  0114),  Washington, 
DC: The World Bank. 
Huber,  P.  (2004).  Inter-regional  mobility  in  Europe 
– A note on the cross-country evidence. Applied 
Economics Letters, 11(10), 619-624.
Jarret, P. (2011). Pension reforms in Poland and else-
where: The view from Paris (Network studies & 
analyses No. 425), Warsaw, Center for Social and 
Economic Research (CASE).
Jorion, P., & Goetzmann, W. N. (1999). Global stock 
markets in the twentieth century. Journal of Fi-
nance, 54(3), 953-980.
Jousten, A., & Pestieau, P. (2002). Labor mobility, re-
distribution  and  pension  reform  in  Europe.  In 
M. Feldstein & H. Siebert (Eds.), Social Security 
Pension Reform in Europe (85-108), Chicago, IL: 
University of Chicago Press.
Milevsky, M. A. (2009). Are you a stock or a bond? Cre-
ate own pension plan for a secure financial future. 
New Jersey, NJ: Financial Times Press. 
OECD(2011) (2011). Society at a Glance 2011 - OECD 
Social Indicators. Retrieved from www.oecd.org/
els/social/indicators/SAG
Peeters, M. (2011). “Better safe than sorry” – Individual 
risk free pension schemes in the European Union 
– Macroeconomic benefits, the mobile working citi-
zen’s perspective and why nots.  (MPRA Working 
Paper No. 33571). University Library of Munich, 
Germany.
Peeters, M., & Groot, L. (2012). Demographic change 
across the globe - Maintaining social security in 
ageing economies. World Economics, 13(2), 75-98.
Peeters, M., & Den Reijer, A. (2012). On wage forma-
tion, wage flexibility and wage coordination - A fo-
cus on the wage impact of productivity in Germany, 
Greece,  Ireland,  Portugal,  Spain  and  the  United 
States (MPRA Working Paper No. 31102). Univer-
sity Library of Munich, Germany.
Pozen, R. C., & Hamacher, T. (2011). The fund indus-
try: How your money is managed. New Jersey, NJ: 
Wiley and Sons Inc. 
Razin, A., & Sadka, E. (1999). Migration and pension 
with international capital mobility. Journal of Pub-
lic Economics, 74(1), 141-150.
Sinha, T. (2002). Can Latin American’s experience teach 
us something about privatized pensions with per-
sonal  accounts?  Paper  presented  at  Retirement 
Implications of Demographic and family change 
symposium in San Francisco.
Van Groezen, B., Kiiver, H., & Unger, B. (2009). Ex-
plaining Europeans’ preferences for pension pro-
vision.  European  Journal  of  Political  Economy, 
25(2), 237-246. 
Zaidi, A., Grech, A. G., & Fuchs, M. (2006). Pension 
policy in EU25 and its possible impact on elderly 
poverty.  (CASE  Papers  case  116),  Centre  for 
Analysis of Social Exclusion, LSE.